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Abstract 
Healthcare privatisations have been advocated as a cure to the increasing healthcare expenditures in 
advanced economies. Nevertheless, it has not been established whether such policy measures actually 
curb aggregate healthcare expenditures. This paper quantitatively analyses this question. We use a 
coherent way to identify de facto healthcare financing privatisations across countries over time, i.e. 
policy induced statistically significant shifts in the public share of healthcare expenditures. Propensity 
score matching is used to evaluate the effects of privatisations. In other words, an appropriate 
counterfactual is found to assess what would have happened had a certain privatisation not taken place. 
The results from 21 OECD countries show that healthcare financing privatisations lead to cost savings 
in total healthcare expenditures. The estimated average cost saving is of the magnitude 0.75 percentage 
points of GDP per year, over a 5-year period after the privatisation. The results are robust to various 
sensitivity tests.   
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1. Introduction  
Healthcare reforms, including Healthcare Financing (HCF) privatisations have long been proposed as a 
tool to curb the rising cost of healthcare in advanced countries (OECD 1987, OECD 1992, Oxley & 
MacFarlan 1995). Several studies have tried to disentangle the consequences of healthcare 
privatisations, both in terms of quality, equality and costs (Colombo & Tapay 2004, Saltman & Figueras 
1998, Tuohy et al. 2004). One common characteristic of these studies is reliance on case study evidence, 
which is largely descriptive and does not investigate causal relations in a rigorous way.1 This research 
cannot establish whether privatisations deliver efficiency increases. In fact, Stabile & Thomson (2014) 
argue that specific incentive structures matter rather than whether HCF is public or private. Our 
analysis, however, shows that HCF privatisations are important for Healthcare Expenditures (HCE).  
The OECD (1992) argues that HCF privatisations work by improving macro-economic efficiency. If 
healthcare is largely publicly financed, consumers are not cost conscious. They have incentives to 
demand more than the optimum level of health care. Similarly, providers have incentives to deliver this. 
Consequently if payment for healthcare shifts from public to private ‘pockets’, all else being equal, 
demand will decline to more optimal levels and total HCE will decrease relative to the status quo. The 
OECD does not provide solid empirical evidence for this claim, but base the claim on case studies of 7 
OECD countries. 
However, the privatisation literature suggests that privatisations often happen as a consequence of 
‘special interest politics’ instead of efficiency reasons. For example, right wing market-oriented 
governments privatise HCF to reduce the re-distributional effects of a public tax financed system. If this 
rationale is behind privatisations rather than an economic welfare analysis, it is unclear whether 
privatisations deliver efficiency increases, see Cavaliere & Scabrosetti (2008).  
By now a large literature on the determinants of HCE exists. This literature tries to explain why HCE 
have increased so much in the post-war era. Most of these studies have used a ‘determinants approach’ 
where HCE is regressed on variables thought to affect it. The econometric approach suffers from 
simultaneity and spurious regression relationships (Hansen & King 1996, Amiri & Ventelou 2012, 
Huarng & Yu 2015). This literature also comes up with suggestions about variables that can be 
influenced to reduce costs; see Di Mateo & Di Mateo (1998) for a brief overview. Some of these studies 
look at whether the public share of total HCE impacts total HCE. Leu (1986) finds that a larger public 
share is associated with higher total spending on health care. Hitris & Posnett (1992) find no effect of 
the public share of HCE on total HCE.  
Thus, it is unclear whether HCF privatisations deliver total cost savings. We evaluate this question 
empirically using quantitative methods. Following Wiese (2014) we employ a methodology that allows 
coherent identification of HCF privatisations across countries over time. The methodology is based on 
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structural break test to identify statistically significant breaks in the share of publicly financed HCE. The 
breaks are treated as potential reforms for which validation using de jure evidence of reforms is needed. 
The identified privatisations are policy induced and makes a statistically significant economic impact. 
26 de facto HCF privatisations are identified in 21 OECD countries using this methodology.  
We estimate the effect of HCF privatisations on the average change in total HCE as percentage of GDP 
over 3- and 5-year periods following a privatisation. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is used to 
identify a reasonable counterfactual. Common economic and political factors from the ‘reform trigger 
literature’ are used to predict the propensity scores. To make the results independent of any specific 
matching technique various matching techniques are used. Over a 3-year evaluation period we find a 
negative, but non-robust effect. Over a 5-year evaluation period we find a clear negative and robust 
effect. The economic effect of HCF privatisations is of the magnitude 0.75 percentage points of GDP 
average yearly saving over a 5-year period.  
Due to data restrictions we cannot assess changes in health quality, coverage and inequality that may 
result from the analysed privatisations. The cost saving may result from parts of the population having 
no, or restricted access to healthcare, or from decreases in quality. We cannot assess if the estimated 
effect comes from efficiency increases, or from less desirable effects.  
In section 2 the HCF privatisations are identified and the methodology used is explained. In section 3 
the propensity score method is put into context along with the data. Section 4 gives the main results, 
while section 5 investigates the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes and discusses the 
implications of the results.  
 
2. Identifying HCF privatisations 
2.1 Structural breaks 
We employ the methodology of Wiese (2014) to identify privatisations. For clarity the methodology is 
explained in detail below.  
There exist a broad and narrow group of definitions of privatisations in the literature. The broad 
definition concerns overall shifts in the boundary between public and private involvement in the 
economic sphere (e.g. Vickers & Yarrow 1991). The narrow definition concerns shifts in ownership 
(e.g. Roberts & Saeed 2012). The drawback of the broad definition is that it is problematic to 
operationalize. The drawback of the narrow definition is that it fails to capture shifts from the public to 
the private domain when no shift in ownership takes place.2 This is the case with healthcare-financing 
privatisations (see appendix table A2). However, we can measure public versus private sector 
involvement instead of ownership. Furthermore, we need to make sure that shifts in involvement are 
both policy induced and have a statistically significant impact. Therefore, a de facto HCF privatisation 
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is defined as a statistically significant policy induced shift from public to private sector financing of 
healthcare services.  
We measure to what extent public and private funds finance healthcare. The historical ratio yit of public 
HCE relative to total HCE (public + private) in country i at time t can be used to identify privatisations.3 
Using data provided by the OECD, this ratio is calculated as: . It 
can be interpreted as the percentage of public financing of total spending. Hence, we have a measure of 
public relative to private financing of heath care. Table 1 gives summary statistics for 21 OECD 
countries in the sample. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables used to identify privatisations 
Variable  obs. mean st.dev. min. max. source: 
Public healthcare expenditure % of GDP 924 5.53 1.75 0.84 9.76 OECD.org 
Private healthcare expenditure % of GDP 935 2.08 1.36 0.11 9.03 OECD.org 
Total healthcare expenditure  % of GDP (private + public) 966 7.59 2.27 1.49 17.05 OECD.org 
Public relative to total expenditure, yit 924 0.73 0.13 0.22 0.98 Calculated 
All available observations for the 21 OECD countries between 1960-2013 have been used. Belgium is excluded, see 
table 2 for countries and sample periods. West German data is used prior 1990 for Germany. 
 
Then structural break testing is applied to identify significant shifts in yit. A structural break is the 
timing at which a fundamental change in the Data Generating Process (DGP) occurs, for example due to 
an economic reform.4 However, a structural break can be caused by other factors, such as exogenous 
shifts in consumer preferences, or relative price movements. Thus, the detected structural breaks need to 
be validated.  
Perhaps the best-known structural break test is the Chow-test. However, the test only appropriate to 
examine whether a time series contains a single structural break. When using this test the sample is split 
at a point in time where a priori information leads one to expect a break. A F-test is then performed to 
determine whether subsample parameters are significantly different. For the application at hand, de jure 
evidence gives a priori information of several potential structural breaks in each time series (up to 25, 
see Healthcare Systems in Transition (HSiT) country reports). This means that the time series would 
have to be split into a large number of subsamples on which the Chow-test should be performed. This is 
infeasible because the time series not are long enough when there are so many potential breaks. 
Furthermore, there is often a time lag before a de jure reform manifests itself in the data; institutions are 
rigid (Acemoglu et al. 2006). This means that the division of a time series into subsamples would be 
arbitrary.        
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 Public healthcare expenditure is defined as: “health expenditure incurred by public funds. Public funds are state, regional and local 
Government bodies and social security schemes. Public capital formation on health includes publicly financed investment in health 
facilities plus capital transfers to the private sector for hospital construction and equipment” (OECD.org). Private healthcare 
expenditure is defined as: “Privately funded part of total health care expenditure. Private sources of funds include out-of-pocket 
payments (both over-the-counter and cost-sharing), private insurance programs, charities and occupational health care” 
(OECD.org). 
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The feasible approach is to start from the economic data and then use de jure evidence for validation. 
Hence, the number and timing of structural breaks are treated as unknown a priori. Bai & Perron (1998, 
2003) (B&P hereafter) develop a general method for this purpose. In order to define potential 
privatisations (and nationalisations) in the context of the B&P-filter, consider a model with m possible 
structural breaks in an OLS regression framework that takes the form:  
                                                                  yt=δj+ut                              (t=1,...,T ,   j=1,…,m+1) 
Where yt is the dependent variable, in this case the time series of public relative to total healthcare 
expenditure for each country considered. δj is a vector of estimated coefficients (constants) of which 
there are m+1, i.e. δj is the mean at the different segments of the time series yt. ut is the error term. The 
segments generate a stepwise linear route through the times series yt and give m structural breaks. The 
idea underlying the B&P-filter is straightforward.5 It generates the segmented route through the series 
that yields the lowest Sum of Squared Residuals (SSR) up to a maximum number of breaks. The 
maximum number of breaks is restricted by a trimming parameter h, which specifies a minimum 
number of observations that has to occur between consecutive breaks 
 
Fig 1. Structural breaks in healthcare financing source: The case of Portugal 
 
In the context of Fig. 1, the segments can be thought of as regimes where yt fluctuates around the 
constant mean δj. A downward (upward) regime shift is detected as a potential privatisation 
(nationalisation), for which validation is required. A shift to a new regime is unlikely to happen by 
chance, dependent on the test-size employed. We employ a 5% significance level. Thus, a regime shift 
implies that the underlying DGP has been altered generating a structural break.  
When applying the B&P-filter 3 general test procedures are possible, see B&P (1998, 2003):  
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 The process underlying the algorithm is also straightforward. First, it searches for all possible sets of breaks up to a maximum 
number of breaks, restricted by the trimming parameter chosen, and determines for each number of breaks the set that minimises the 
SSR (Sum of Squared Residuals). Then F-tests determine whether the improved fit produced by allowing an additional break is 
sufficiently large, compared to what can be expected randomly, on the basis of the asymptotic distribution derived in B&P (1998). 
After determining the appropriate number of breaks the program extracts the corresponding break dates of the optimal sequential 
route. The trimming parameter h is expressed either as a fixed number of observations, or a percentage of the number of 
observations. Autocorrelation, trending time series and non-constant errors are permitted (Bai & Perron 2003). 

























1. Compares the fit of global L breaks with the fit of a model with no breaks, and selects the highest 
number of breaks that are significant.  
2. Starts with a H0 of no break, and then sequentially test k vs. k+1 breaks until the test statistics is 
insignificant. 
 
3. Picks the lowest value of the BIC (Bayesian Information Criteria) to select the appropriate number of 
breaks. 
We chose procedure 1 as our baseline identification method. The reason is that method 2 is too 
conservative, only 5 potential privatisations are identified using this method, see table A1 in the 
appendix. This is not enough to estimate a credible average treatment effect. Furthermore, the de jure 
evidence of reforms suggests many more privatisations. Using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
for model selection identifies a somewhat different set of potential privatisations compared to our 
preferred method, see table A1 in the appendix. B&P (2003) show that information criterion biases the 
number of identified breaks downwards, but least so if the BIC is used. We find one potential 
privatisation less using BIC and differences in the identified potential privatisations (country-year pairs) 
compared to our baseline method, see table A1 in the appendix.     
Furthermore, when applying the B&P-filter a choice has to be made concerning the size of the trimming 
parameter h. If the times series do not exhibit autocorrelation or heteroskedaticity any trimming will 
work regardless of sample size (Bai & Perron 2003). With finite samples that do exhibit autocorrelation 
and/or heteroskedaticity, like our data series, the trimming needs to be increased. Here a trimming of 
h=0.15 or h=0.2 is chosen because it generates the best fit with de jure evidence while still being 
econometrically sound.6 The trimming parameter implies that no potential privatisation can be identified 
at the beginning and end of each series. The appropriate observations are excluded in the estimations 
that follow to avoid identification error. A Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix is used, see Antoshin et al. (2008).  
 
2.2 Healthcare privatisations 
The outcome of running the B&P-filter on the 21 OECD countries can be found in column 3 in table 2. 
Column 4 shows the potential privatisations that can be validated, see table A2 in the appendix for 
details. 1960-2013 is selected as sample period. For some countries data is unavailable for the whole 
period. In that case the longest data period available is used, see column 2 for exact sample periods.  
Table 2: Identified privatisations, baseline filter specification  
Country Sample 
period 
Global L breaks vs. none, B&P test 
statistics 5% significance level 
Validated 
Australia  1971-2011 1977 1977 
Austria 1960-2012 1967  1967 
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 Choosing the trimming to be a percentage of the sample size implies that the number of minimum observations that can occur 
between breaks becomes lower for shorter samples. Bai & Perron (2003) argue that shorter samples exhibiting autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity calls for larger trimmings in percentage of the sample size. So, we chose h=0.2 for the shorter samples, see table 
A2 in the appendix.    
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Canada 1970-2012 1986, 1993, 1999 1986, 1993 
Denmark 1971-2012 1984, 1990 1984, 1990 
Finland 1960-2013 1994 1994 
France 1990-2012 2003 2003 
Germany 1970-2013 1983, 1998, 2004 1983, 1998, 2004 
Greece 1987-2011 1994 1994 
Iceland 1960-2013 1993 1993 
Ireland 1960-2012 1985, 2006 2006 
Italy 1988-2013 1994 1994 
Japan 1960-2012 -- -- 
Netherlands 1972-2002 -- -- 
New Zealand 1970-2011 1990 1990 
Norway 1960-2013 1980, 1988, 1997 1988, 1997 
Portugal 1970-2011 1982, 2006 1982, 2006 
Spain 1960-2012 1995 1995 
Sweden 1970-2012 1985, 1992, 2001 1985, 1992, 2001 
Switzerland 1985-2012 -- -- 
UK 1960-2012 1985, 1997 1985, 1997 
USA 1960-2012 -- -- 
Total  29 26 
Data source for validated privatisations: HSiT (Healthcare Systems in Transition) country reports; see table A2 in the 
appendix for details.  
-- means that the filter does not identify any potential privatisation. Belgium was excluded from the sample because the 
time series is too short to run the B&P-filter.  
 
It is possible that factors outside control of the policy-maker move the ratio yt significantly and hence 
look like a reform when it in fact was not. Therefore, it is checked whether the detected privatisations 
are likely to result from planned policy. For that purpose the WHO’s and European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies “Healthcare Systems in Transition” country report series were employed. 
These reports are available for each country covering the sample period and have descriptions of de jure 
reforms introduced over time. When a report describes a policy reform that directly or indirectly could 
have had the objective to either reduce the public share of HCF, increase the private share of HCF, or 
both, it is taken as evidence of a de jure reform. A time lag is present between the de jure reforms and 
their outcomes (Acemoglu et al. 2006). In most cases the length of this lag is one year (see table A2 in 
the appendix). If more than two years passed between a de jure reform and a detected structural break, 
the reform is not coded as a de facto privatisation. See column 4 in table 2 for the outcome of this 
analysis, and table A2 in the appendix for a description of the related de jure reforms. As we are 
interested in whether healthcare privatisation policies work, only the de facto privatisations are used 
when estimating the effect on total HCE. The non-validated privatisations may result from relative price 
movements, which may also reduce total healthcare spending. But it is hard to pinpoint whether this is a 
result of planned policy.  
In sum, the analysis reveals that 26 of the 29 detected privatisations can be validated. We are therefore 
confident that these 26 structural breaks are the result of planned policy, and therefore match the 
definition of a de facto HCF privatisation. Years in which a privatisation is detected and validated are 
coded as 1, the remaining years as 0. This constitutes the Treatment Identification Variable (TIV) used 
in the estimations that follow.  
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2.3 Case study 
Before we proceed with estimations of the effect of healthcare privatisations on total HCE we end this 
section with a case study. This is done to highlight the benefits of the presented methodology. Without 
loss of generality the case of Norway is selected.  
The identification of healthcare privations based on the B&P-filter alone identifies a potential 
privatisation in 1980. The HSiT (Johnsen 2006) report provides an overview of healthcare reforms in 
Norway through time. The report does not describe any reforms within the two years preceding 1980. 
Had we relied solely on economic output data to identify the reforms we would have concluded that a 
privatisation had taken place. However, using de jure data to verify the detected reforms prevents such 
identification errors.  
The other possible method that has been argued for in the literature is the use of policy input data alone. 
However, this approach is at least as problematic as using economic outcome data alone. The HSiT 
(Johnsen 2006, p.125) report provides an overview of “Major health care reforms and policy measures” 
from 1984 to 2004. In that period more than 10 reforms occurred that potentially could have had a 
significant impact on whether HCF would shift from public to private payment. Thus, without 
application of outcome data we would have made several identification errors, as only 3 breaks are 
identified in Norway. Additionally, when relying on policy input data alone it is necessary to interpret 
reform descriptions. What was the primary intention of a given reform, a privatisation or a 
nationalisation, if any? Often, as supported by the statistical analysis above and the HSiT reports, the 
objective of the reforms was to improve the efficiency of the healthcare system. Thus, the combination 
of both economic outcome data and policy input data offers an objective way to identify HCF 
privatisations.  
A risk of the methodology is that that the outcome of a de jure reform can be hidden in the data by 
unrelated economic changes, such as exogenous shifts in consumer preferences or relative price 
movements. The opposite can also happen, i.e. a policy change has no significant impact on the data, but 
unrelated economic changes lead us to conclude that it had. Either way, our sequential procedure is less 
prone to identification error than identification using policy input data or economic outcome data alone. 
 
3. Propensity score matching and determinants of HCF privatisations 
3.1 Propensity score matching  
Non-parametric estimators have become common to assess the effect of a certain treatment in the 
absence of experimental data. Not only for analysis in medical science (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983), but 
also in various fields of economics such as: Labour Economics (Heckman et al. 1997), Political 
Economics (Person et al. 2001) and Micro Finance (Imai et al. 2010). Propensity score matching has 
become a standard tool to assess the effects of treatments like (policy) interventions. Therefore we only 
briefly review the main idea behind the method, see Rubin (1974, 1977) for more details. 
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Consider our group of 21 OECD countries of which some in certain years experience a healthcare 
privatisation. In these years the Treatment Identification Variable TIV=1, in all other years TIV=0. We 
are interested in whether the non-random assignment of this treatment has an effect on total HCE. The 
hypothesis is that it has negative effects (declining HCE); the alternative is that it has no effect. It is well 
known from the economic reform literature that the effect of reform follows a J-curve pattern of short-
run costs, and longer run gains (Hellman 1998). Therefore, the outcome variable is defined as the 
‘average change in total HCE’ over a 3- and 5-year period following a treatment.7  
Ideally we would like to know what would have happened to a given country had the country not 
privatised HCF. However, such a counterfactual cannot be obtained in a non-experimental setting where 
treatments are assigned non-randomly. It is rather likely that the countries that undergo healthcare 
privatisations are the ones were there is a potential for total cost savings. This implies selection of 
treatment that will bias any OLS estimate.  
PSM offers a way to identify an appropriate counterfactual, and hence a way to reduce selection bias. 
The method consists of two steps. First a logit (or probit) model is used to estimate probabilities of 
receiving a treatment, i.e. the propensity scores. Second, different matching techniques are used to 
match each country-year observation that received a treatment with different country and/or year 
observations that did not receive a treatment, but is similar on observable characteristics.8 After this the 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) can be calculated. ATT is the average difference 
between the outcomes in treated countries and the matched counterfactuals.  
The crucial assumption underlying the method is ‘conditional independence’. No omitted or 
unobservable variable influences both the choice of healthcare privatisation and total HCE once we have 
controlled for variables effecting treatment assignment in the first step. This assumption allows us to 
replace the unobservable ideal counterfactual with an observation with similar characteristics as the 
treated observation given the propensity score. After this we can assess whether the assigned treatment 
has an effect, independent of selection bias.  
 
3.2 Determinants of HCF privatisations  
Due to the ‘conditional independence assumption’ a central part of PSM is selection of an appropriate 
set of covariates to estimate the propensity scores. We rely on the literature on economic and political 
factors that trigger economic reforms and privatisations. Specifically, we consider economic, political 
and demographic factors that are believed to cause total HCE, and therefore also HCF privatisations. 
Also, we strive for a parsimonious model, see table A3 in the appendix for descriptive statistics of the 
covariates used for matching.  
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 Since our outcome variable is the average over 3 or 5 observations we drop observations from the control group before and after a 
treatment in a given country-year observation. For example, for the 5-year average outcomes, we drop the 4 preceding and the 4 
following observations from the control group. Otherwise, an observation with TIV=1 could be matched with a TIV=0 observation in 
which the outcome contains part of the outcome from the TIV=1 observation. Neglecting this would lead to biased estimates.      
8
 In principle a treatment can be matched with control(s) from the same country. However, this is not a problem if this is the best 
counterfactual based on observable characteristics. It can be argued that controls from the same country are the best counterfactuals.    
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Economic crises are perhaps the most common factor thought to trigger economic reforms in general. 
Rodrik (1996) claims that crises are a sufficient and necessary condition for reform, like smoke 
following a fire. Drazen (2000) shows theoretically why this may be the case. The empirical evidence is 
robust; crises trigger reforms (e.g. Drazen & Easterly 2001, Pitlik & Wirth 2003, Wiese 2014). 
Therefore, several measures that capture different economic crises are included: the growth rate of GDP, 
the unemployment rate and the severity of government indebtedness. 9  In times of crises both 
governments and consumers are likely to cut HCE, at the same time privatisations become more likely. 
The Health Economics literature on the determinants of HCE has consistently found that GDP 
determines it (De Mateo & De Mateo 1998). Furthermore, the inflation rate is included because 
governments can use their power to issue new money to finance fiscal expenditures, and therefore also 
rising costs to public health care. At the same time a high inflation rate may signal economic crisis, so 
the probability of reform increases.  
Special interest politics may drive privatisations. In the political economics literature this is referred to 
as the ‘partisan hypothesis’ (Hibbs 1977). Political parties promote policies that favour their 
constituencies. Left-wing governments prefer a public system and right-wing market-oriented 
governments favour privatisation. Therefore, the Potrafke (2009) index of the ideological orientation of 
governments, in terms of economic policy, is included. Also, it is well established both theoretically and 
empirically that a more fractionalised government finds it harder to agree on welfare improving reforms 
(Alesina & Drazen 1991). Therefore, the measure of political fractionalisation of governments of Beck 
et al. (2001) is included.  
Two variables that capture cost developments that are likely to impact the probability of health care 
financing privatisations are included. First, the percentage of the population more than 65 years old is 
included. This is an important factor driving the costs of healthcare because a larger fraction of elderly 
implies higher costs and declining tax revenues to finance the costs (Di Mateo & Di Mateo 1998, Oxley 
and McFarlan 1995). Second, we include a variable capturing the medium term trend in healthcare costs 
directly. The variable is the average of the 5 previous years total HCE as percentage of GDP. The reason 
to include it is, that if costs are rapidly increasing it calls for strong policy action, such as HCF 
privatisations. This variable captures both demand and supply driven costs increases in the medium 
term, such as technological advances that impact costs and hence also privatisation decisions. 
Lastly, duration dependence in panel models with a binary dependent variable makes wrong inference 
likely if not taken into consideration. Maximum likelihood estimators rely on the assumption that the 
probability of privatisation within countries is independent over time. Beck et al. (1998) show that panel 
data with a binary dependent variable is identical to grouped duration data, and propose a simple 
method to correct for temporal dependence. The method is based on the construction of a set of dummy 
variables counting the length of the spell of no privatisation at every observation, counting from the last 
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 The severity of government indebtedness is captured by the interest rate on long-term government debt. This variable captures the 
financial markets’ judgement of the sustainability of debt. The debt-to-GDP ratio does not capture the sustainability of debt.  
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year of privatisation. The intuition is that the length of the spell has an impact on the probability that a 
privatisation will occur. Including these spell dummies has a serious drawback; they take up many 
degrees of freedom. To mitigate this problem, Beck et al. (1998) propose the construction of three cubic 
splines that mimic the spell dummies by creating a smoothened function for duration dependence. 
Additionally, they propose to include a variable that counts the number of previous privatisations, and a 
variable that counts the length of the spell since the previous privatisation. All three suggestions are 
included in the estimations (see also Mierau et al. 2007, Wiese 2014). Previous privatisations may 
impact the probability of further privatisations; at the same time the privatisations are likely to impact 
total HCE. So, we need to control for duration dependence when estimating the propensity scores.  
The identified privatisations are used as dependent variable in a binary dependent variable logistic 




if we observe a privatisation, i.e. 	 = 1. In terms of the underlying latent variable this means 
that the government only decides to privatise when the (expected) benefit from doing so is positive, if 

∗ ≤ 0 we will not observe a privatisation, i.e. 	 = 0. 
When the logit estimator is applied ∗ =   +  is interpreted as the government’s inclination to 
privatise. xit is a vector containing our covariates, β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated and εit is a 
vector of random errors. The probability of privatisation is: (	 = 1) → (∗ > 0) → ( >
−
 ) → (
 )  where F is the logistic cumulative distribution function that ensures that the 
estimated propensity scores are bounded between zero and one.  
Running this model on our sample of 21 countries and 565 observations results in an estimate with a 
pseudo-R2 of 12.8%. The debt crisis indicator, unemployment rate, inflation rate and the percentage of 
the population over 65 are significant at the 5% level with the expected signs. The political variables are 
insignificant. The duration dependence variables are jointly significant at the 5% level; this provides 
evidence that they should be included in the model (see Beck et al. 1998).10     
                                                        
10
 For the alternative BIC filter specification the pseudo-R2 is 21.6%. The same covariates are significant with the expected signs. See 
Fig. A1 in the appendix for a common support graph.   
 11
 
Fig. 2: Common support distribution for the baseline propensity scores 
 
Fig. 2 shows the estimated propensity scores for the treated observations and the control observations 
for the privatisations identified using the baseline B&P-filter specification. Concerning treatment 
observations with a propensity score close to 0.3 or above, there is no overlap in the propensity score 
distributions, i.e. there are no suitable counterfactual(s). These observations are dropped.11  For the 
remaining treatment observations there are good counterfactuals, which have a similar propensity of 
receiving a treatment based on observable characteristics.  
Following Aidt and Franck (2015), we apply 5 different matching algorithms with the objective to use 
methods that are dissimilar.  
1: Nearest neighbour matching: for each TIV=1 observation it selects the observation from the control 
group with the propensity score closest to the treated observation. We impose that the same control 
observation cannot be used multiple times as a match, i.e. matching without replacement. 
2: 5 nearest neighbours with replacement. Aside from performing the matching with replacement, it 
matches the treated observation with the five closest observations from the control group in terms of 
their propensity score.  
3: Nearest Neighbour with replacement, imposing a calliper distance. Using this approach, pairs of 
treated and control observations are formed such that the difference in propensity scores between 
matched subjects differs at most by 1% in probability. 
4: Kernel bootstrap. It constructs a match for each treated observations using a weighted average over 
multiple observations in the control group.  
5: Kernel bootstrap with trimming=3. In contrast to the fourth approach it imposes common support by 
trimming 3 percentages of the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the 
control observations is the lowest. 
 
                                                        
11
 The privatisations in Denmark 1984, Finland 1994, Spain 1995 and Sweden 1992 are dropped. 
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4. Main results  
The results indicate that HCF privatisations lead to a significant HCE saving in the medium run. In the 
short run the results suggest a less strong effect. Table 3 shows the ATT for the baseline identification 
strategy of HCF privatisations for different matching algorithms over the 3- and 5-year time horizon. 22 
of the 26 validated healthcare privatisations are used, while 4 observations with TIV=1 are dropped due 
to the lack of common support (see fig. 2 and footnote 12).  
Table 3: Baseline ATT estimates using different matching algorithms  

















 (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (p-value) (p-value) 
      
Total HC expenditures as % 
of GPD - 3 years average -0.107* -0.040 -0.107* -0.064 -0.067 
 (-1.83) (-0.79) (-1.83) (0.185) (0.162) 
Total HC expenditures as % 
of GPD - 5 years average -0.073** -0.073*** -0.073** -0.074** -0.079*** 
 (-2.01) (-2.35) (-2.01) (0.013) (0.009) 
Notes: This table contains the ATT using the baseline B&P-filter specification. All estimates are on the common 
support. For the bootstrap we use 1000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Value for maximum distance of controls 
2
 imposes common support by dropping # percentage of the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the 
control observations is the lowest  
 
As expected, the ATT for the 3-year average health care expenditure as percentage of GDP is less 
substantial than the 5-year average. The results weakly indicate that healthcare costs decline over the 3-
year evaluation period. All average treatment effects are estimated with a negative sign, only matching 
method 1 and 3 are significant at the 10% level. The remaining effects are insignificant.  
Concerning the ATT for the 5-year average HCE as percentage of GDP the results clearly show a 
substantial cost saving from privatisations. All five matching techniques are significant at the 5% level; 
techniques 2 and 5 are significant at the 1% level. The effect of a HCF privatisation is estimated 
consistently across matching techniques. The results suggest an average cost saving over the 5-year 
period of about 0.75 percentage points of GDP each year. Accumulated this means that approximately 
3.75 percentage points of GDP are saved over five years. This is a substantial economic effect. Given 
our estimate for the 3-year average effect, the effect mainly comes from the 4th and 5th year following 
the privatisation. This is in line with the literature that evaluates the economic consequences of 
economic reforms. A central finding in this literature is that the economic effects of reforms follow a J-
curve pattern. First there are short-run (adjustment) costs and in the longer run the benefits are realised 
(Hellman 1998). It would be interesting to evaluate the effect over a longer time horizon. But given our 
empirical strategy this means that too many observations have to be dropped from the control group. 
Additionally, over a longer time horizon the probability that other factors impact the outcome variable 
becomes too large.  
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5. Robustness analysis 
To investigate whether the specification of B&P-filter used to identify potential healthcare privatisations 
impacts the results we redo the analysis in section 4. That is, we use the BIC to select the optimal 
number of breaks and the corresponding timing of the breaks. Using this specification we identify 28 
potential privatisations of which 25 can be validated. There are also differences concerning the countries 
and the timing (see table A1 in the appendix for the privatisations identified using this filter 
specification).  
The results are less strong using the alternative filter specification; see table 4. None of the estimated 
ATT effects concerning the 3-year averages are significant. Concerning the 5-year average effects 
matching method 1 is significant at the 10% level with the expected sign, and method 3 is marginally 
insignificant. Nevertheless, all signs are negative and the estimated effects are in line with the baseline 
results. B&P (1998) shows that the use of information criteria to select the break dates is less precise 
compared to the asymptotic B&P-test. This may be driving the differences compared to the main results.   
Table 4: ATT estimates using different matching algorithms (privatisations identified using BIC 
for model selection) 

















 (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (p-value) (p-value) 
      
Total HC expenditures as % 
of GPD - 3 years average -0.048 -0.039 -0.058 -0.018 -0.060 
 (-0.87) (-0.79) (-1.00) (0.683) (0.228) 
Total HC expenditures as % 
of GPD - 5 years average -0.072* -0.048 -0.067 -0.031 -0.047 
 (-1.80) (-1.27) (-1.60) (0.374) (0.186) 
Notes: This table contains the ATT using the BIC information criteria. All estimates are on the common support. For 
the bootstrap we use 1000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Value for maximum distance of controls 
2
 imposes common support by dropping # per cent of the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the control 
observations is the lowest  
 
Also, the inclusion of the duration dependence variables may be a cause of concern, as it is unclear 
whether their inclusion in estimating the propensity scores causes the estimated effects. Therefore the 
baseline specification in section 4 is redone without their inclusion. Excluding these variables does not 
cause the main result to vanish, see table 5. On the contrary, the estimated effects are stronger. For the 
3-year averages the results of matching method 1, 3, 4 and 5 are significant at the 10% level. For the 5-
year averages the results of all but method 2 are significant at the 1% level, method 2 at the 5% level. 
The estimated 5-year average cost saving is between 0.7 and 1 percentage point of GDP.  So the main 
result is not driven by the inclusion of duration dependence variables.  
Table 5: ATT estimates using different matching algorithms (baseline privatisations) excluding 
splines 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












 (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (p-value) (p-value) 
      
Total HC expenditures as % 
of GPD - 3 years average -0.104* -0.076 -0.103* -0.083* -0.083* 
 (-1.91) (-1.62) (-1.81) 0.065 (0.071) 
Total HC expenditures as % 
of GPD - 5 years average -0.104*** -0.067** -0.092*** -0.081*** -0.077*** 
 (-2.94) (-2.33) (-2.39) (0.004) (-2.76) 
Notes: This table contains the ATT using the baseline B&P-filter specification. All estimates are on the common 
support. For the bootstrap we use 1000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Value for maximum distance of controls 
2
 imposes common support by dropping # percentage of the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the 
control observations is the lowest  
 
Likewise, it is important to establish whether individual countries included in the sample are driving the 
results. In table 6 we re-estimate the baseline results for the 3-year average effect excluding each 
individual country one at the time. The main outcome is that the inclusion of Italy and Spain in our main 
results causes them to be less strong and insignificant. Also, if Sweden or Switzerland is excluded the 
effects that are significant at the 10% level in the main results become insignificant. 
Table 7 does the same for the 5-year averages. The exclusion of Italy causes the estimated ATT to 
increase. Both table 6 and 7 show that the main results not are driven by the inclusion of any specific 
country. 
Table 6: ATT estimates using different matching algorithms excluding individual countries (three 
years average) 



















  (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (p-value) (p-value) 
       
Total HC 
expenditures as % 
of GPD - 3 years 
average Australia -0.086 -0.031 -0.086 -0.061 -0.064 
  (-1.43) (-0.58) (-1.43) (0.249) (0.217) 
- Austria -0.112* -0.039 -0.112* -0.067 -0.069 
  (-1.93) (-0.77) (-1.93) (0.170) (0.154) 
- Canada -0.107* -0.040 -0.107* -0.064 -0.067 
  (-1.83) (-0.79) (-1.83) (0.177) (0.171) 
- Denmark -0.107* -0.026 -0.107* -0.044 -0.048 
  (-1.73) (-0.49) (-1.73) (0.386) (0.321) 
- Finland -0.116* -0.038 -0.116* -0.058 -0.061 
  (-1.95) (-0.71) (-1.95) (0.254) (0.233) 
- France -0.089* -0.040 -0.089* -0.065 -0.068 
  (-1.65) (-0.80) (-1.65) (0.170) (0.172) 
- Germany -0.111* -0.044 -0.111* -0.070 -0.072 
  (-1.82) (-0.83) (-1.82) (0.177) (0.136) 
- Greece -0.108 -0.023 -0.108 -0.055 -0.059 
  (-1.61) (-0.40) (-1.61) (0.325) (0.286) 
- Iceland -0.107* -0.039 -0.107* -0.064 -0.064 
  (-1.83) (-0.76) (-1.83) (0.203) (0.203) 
- Ireland -0.041 -0.022 -0.041 -0.062 -0.066 
  (-0.68) (-0.41) (-0.68) (0.220 (0.178) 
- Italy -0.134*** -0.065 -0.134*** -0.089* -0.090** 
  (-2.36) (-1.34) (-2.36) (0.066) (0.044) 
- Japan -0.106* -0.030 -0.096 -0.051 -0.051 
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  (-1.77) (-0.56) (-1.56) (0.300) (0.325) 
- Netherlands -0.107* -0.046 -0.107* -0.066 -0.066 
  (-1.83) (-0.90) (-1.83) (0.181) (0.185) 
- New Zealand -0.107* -0.040 -0.107* -0.064 -0.067 
  (-1.83) (-0.79) (-1.83) (0.189) (0.154) 
- Norway -0.102* -0.055 -0.107* -0.069 -0.069 
  (-1.69) (-1.07) (-1.78) (0.168) (0.156) 
- Portugal -0.092 -0.065 -0.092 -0.081* -0.083* 
  (-1.57) (-1.29) (-1.57) (0.084) (0.064) 
- Spain -0.133** -0.078 -0.133** -0.091* -0.092* 
  (-2.21) (-1.58) (-2.21) (0.055) (0.055) 
- Sweden -0.081 -0.018 -0.081 -0.042 -0.042 
  (-1.30) (-0.33) (-1.30) (0.431) (0.410) 
- Switzerland -0.081 -0.038 -0.081 -0.064 -0.064 
  (-1.33) (-0.75) (-1.33) (0.199) (0.197) 
- United Kingdom -0.116* -0.041 -0.116* -0.071 -0.071 
  (-1.90) (-0.79) (-1.90) (0.145) (0.130) 
- United States -0.107* -0.040 -0.107* -0.064 -0.064 
  (1.83) (-0.79) (-1.83) (0.186) (0.176) 
Notes: This table contains the ATT using the baseline B&P-filter specification. All estimates are on the common 
support. For the bootstrap we use 1000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Value for maximum distance of controls 
2
 imposes common support by dropping # percentage of the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the 
control observations is the lowest  
 
Table 7: ATT estimates using different matching algorithms excluding individual countries 
(five year average) 



















  (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (p-value) (p-value) 
       
Total HC 
expenditures as % 
of GPD - 5 years 
average Australia -0.067* -0.064** -0.067* -0.070** -0.075** 
  (-1.78) (-1.98) (-1.78) (0.027) (0.013) 
- Austria -0.081** -0.076*** -0.081** -0.077*** -0.081*** 
  (-2.25) (-2.46) (-2.25) (0.010) (0.005) 
- Canada -0.073** -0.073*** -0.073** -0.074** -0.079*** 
  (2.01) (-2.35) (-2.01) (0.013) (0.010) 
- Denmark -0.073** -0.064** -0.073** -0.065** -0.070** 
  (-2.12) (-2.17) (-2.12) (0.032) (0.015) 
- Finland -0.076** -0.066** -0.076** -0.070** -0.075** 
  (-2.06) (-2.05) (-2.06) (0.025) (0.013) 
- France -0.080** -0.071** -0.080** -0.074** -0.079*** 
  (-2.13) (-2.29) (-2.13) (0.014) (0.008) 
- Germany -0.071* -0.070** -0.071* -0.074** -0.078** 
  (-1.86) (-2.15) (-1.86) (0.024) (0.012) 
- Greece -0.070* -0.060* -0.070* -0.067** -0.073** 
  (-1.67) (-1.70) (-1.67) (0.050) (0.039) 
- Iceland -0.073** -0.072** -0.073** -0.074** -0.074** 
  (-2.01) (-2.32) (-2.01) (0.016) (0.018) 
- Ireland -0050 -0.058* -0.050 -0.072** -0.077** 
  (-1.18) (-1.76) (-1.18) (0.023) (0.014) 
- Italy -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.093*** -0.097*** 
  (-2.56) (-3.05) (-2.56) (0.001) (0.001) 
- Japan -0.066* -0.088*** -0.057 -0.072** -0.072** 
  (-1.76) (-2.92) (-1.46) (0.026) (0.027) 
- Netherlands -0.073** -0.094*** -0.073** -0.074** -0.074** 
  (-2.01) (-3.18) (-2.01) (0.011) (0.015) 
- New Zealand -0.073** -0.091*** -0.073** -0.074** -0.079*** 
  (-2.01) (-2.35) (-2.01) (0.011) (0.008) 
- Norway -0.120*** -0.084*** -0.118*** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
  (-3.59) (-2.70) (-3.26) (0.008) (0.010) 
- Portugal -0.069* -0.081*** -0.069* -0.081** -0.086* 
  (-1.87) (-2.51) (-1.87) (0.011) (0.005) 
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- Spain -0.083** -0.094*** -0.083** -0.087*** -0.091* 
  (-2.24) (-2.89) (-2.24) (0.006) (0.004) 
- Sweden -0.066* -0.063* -0.066* -0.073** -0.077** 
  (-1.72) (-1.92) (-1.72) (0.022) (0.018) 
- Switzerland -0.033 -0.070** -0.033 -0.072** -0.072** 
  (-0.94) (-2.24) (-0.94) (0.015) (0.016) 
- United Kingdom -0.075** -0.068** -0.075** -0.067** -0.067** 
  (-1.97) (-2.12) (-1.97) (0.026) (0.025) 
- United States -0.073** -0.068** -0.073** -0.074** -0.079*** 
  (-2.01) (-2.17) (-2.01) (0.012) (0.009) 
Notes: This table contains the ATT using the baseline B&P-filter specification. All estimates are on the common 
support. For the bootstrap we use 1000 replications. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1 Value for maximum distance of controls 
2
 imposes common support by dropping # percentage of the treatment observations at which the propensity score density of the 
control observations is the lowest  
 
6. Conclusion 
The conclusion is that HCF privatisations lead to cost savings in total HCE in the countries included. 
This finding is robust to various sensitivity tests. Only the alternative B&P-filter specification changes 
the statistical significance of the results markedly. B&P (1998) show that when the BIC is used for 
model selection it underestimates the number of breaks. Our results support this finding, the results are 
less convincing when the BIC is used. Still, the results are in line with the main results, albeit less 
convincing.  
The results suggest an annual average cost saving over the 5-year period of 0.75 percentage points of 
GDP per year. Accumulated this means that 3.75 percentage points of GDP are saved over 5 years. Thus 
the analysed policy seems a viable approach to contain or reduce total healthcare costs.  
It seems that gradual shifts from public to private financing can lead to lower health care consumption 
in aggregate. However, we cannot draw conclusions about efficiency. The cost saving might come from 
less desirable effects of the privatisations. Certain groups are more likely to start under-consuming 
healthcare. In particular low-income groups are more likely to be excluded due to their budget 
constraints. Given data restrictions we cannot assess whether the analysed privatisations are causing 
health-inequality to increase. Furthermore, in a private market for healthcare private payment may cause 
consumers to choose options of lower quality. Again, we cannot assess whether the analysed reforms 
are impacting the overall level of health (care) quality. 
In conclusion, the results must not be interpreted as if healthcare-financing privatisations will deliver 
positive outcomes in ‘general equilibrium’. Overall health quality may deteriorate due to a lower quality 
choice by consumers, and/or because parts of the population are indirectly excluded from the system. 
Thus, it is not established whether healthcare-financing privatisations are optimal from a positive 
perspective. If the policy is being pursued with special interest politics in mind, it may be exactly the 
objective to exclude certain parts of the population, or at least restrict their access compared to high-





Table A1: Identified and validated privatisations 
Country Sample period 1. Global L breaks 
vs. none, B&P 
1. Validated 2. BIC 2. Validated  3. Sequential L+1 
breaks vs. L, B&P  
3. Validated 
Australia  1971-2011 1977 1977 -- -- -- -- 
Austria 1960-2012 1967  1967 1967, 1989 1967, 1989 -- -- 
Canada 1970-2012 1986, 1993, 1999 1986, 1993 1986, 1994 1986 1993 1993 
Denmark 1971-2012 1984, 1990 1984, 1990 1984, 1990 1984, 1990 -- -- 
Finland 1960-2013 1994 1994 1993 1993 -- -- 
France 1990-2012 2003 2003 2003, 2008 2003, 2008 -- -- 
Germany 1970-2013 1983, 1998, 2004 1983, 1998, 2004 1983, 1998, 2004 1983, 1998, 2004 -- -- 
Greece 1987-2011 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 
Iceland 1960-2013 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 
Ireland 1960-2012 1985, 2006 2006 1985  -- -- 
Italy 1988-2013 1994 1994 1994 1994 -- -- 
Japan 1960-2012 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Netherlands 1972-2002 -- -- 1996 1996 1998 1998 can be 
validated 
New Zealand 1970-2011 1990 1990 1990 1990 -- -- 
Norway 1960-2013 1980, 1988, 1997 1988, 1997 1980, 1989 1989 -- -- 
Portugal 1970-2011 1982, 2006 1982, 2006 1982 1982 -- -- 
Spain 1960-2012 1995 1995 1989, 1995 1989, 1995 -- -- 
Sweden 1970-2012 1985, 1992, 2001 1985, 1992, 2001 1985, 1992, 2001 1985, 1992, 2001 2000 2000 
Switzerland 1985-2012 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
UK 1960-2012 1985, 1997 1985, 1997 1985, 1997 1985, 1997 -- -- 
USA 1960-2012 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
In total 29 26 28 25 5 5 
The table shows the potential privatisations identified using the 3 general test procedures that can be used when applying the B&P-filter. It also shows which of the potential 
privatisations that can be validated. -- means that the filter does not identify any potential privatisation.  
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Table A2: Description of data used to identify privatisations 
Column 1 and 2 gives the country and sample length. Column 3 shows country specific B&P-filter specification based on the times series properties of each 
series. Underlined years in column 4 and 5 are the detected privatisations that cannot be validated by the qualitative evidence, the remaining can. The detected 
privatisation is the first year of the new regime. These are also summarised in the tables above. If a reasonable policy change occurred no more than two years 
prior to the detected privatisation it is taken as de jure evidence of a reform, see the last three columns.  
Country  Time 
period 
Specification of 
filter based on 
sample properties 
Detected privatisation Policy change: Privatisations 
BIC B&P, global 
L breaks vs. 
none 












1977 • Introduction of universal health insurance (Health Legislation 
Amendment Act 1975-1983). The public share of total health 
expenditure jumped in 1975 with the introduction of Medibank, but 
declined in the late 1970s as a result of the dismantling of Medibank. 





AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15. 
1967, 1989 1967 • Act on Health insurance for Farmers of 1965 
• Act on Health Insurance for the self-employed of 1966 
• Civil Servants’ Health and Work Accident Insurance Act of 1967. 
• Employment and Social Security Tribunal Act of 1987. 
• Cost containment transparency: Direct cost sharing for inpatient stay. 
Reform of 1989. 









AR(2) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15. 
1986, 1994 1986, 1993, 
1999 
• The Canadian Health Act of 1984 denies federal support to provinces that 
allow extra-billing within their insurance schemes and effectively forbids 
private or opted-out practitioners from billing beyond provincially 
mandated fee schedules. 








AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15. 
1984, 1990 1984, 1990 • Introduction of global budgeting in the publicly financed health sector in 
1982.  
• The first coherent national prevention program for health is developed in 
cooperation with relevant sectors in 1989.  
• Budget agreements between the state and the counties increasingly 
include specific objectives and demands introduced in 1990. 







AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15. 
1993 1994 Milestones in the history of the Finish health care system: 
• The 90’s: Increasing deregulation and emphasis on municipal autonomy. 
Reforms in the state administration of health care, subsidy reform. 
Maintaining health care services during and after economic recession. 
1990’s 1990’s 
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Country  Time 
period 
Specification of 
filter based on 
sample properties 
Detected privatisation Policy change: Privatisations 
BIC B&P, global 
L breaks vs. 
none 




(Vuorenkoski et al. 2008) 
France 1990-
2012 
AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.20. 
2003, 2008 2003 • Act no. 2002-322 of March 2002. A contractual convention reforming the 
agreement system between statutory health insurance and healthcare 
professionals  
• The 2003 Social Security Finance act: Reference prices for drugs groups, 
a new system for payment to hospitals, budgets for investment in 
hospitals among other things.  
• Drug delisting and reduced reimbursement of pharmaceuticals to reduce 
costs and increase efficiency 
• Introduction of flat co-payments to reduce statutory health expenditure in 
2005. In 2006 a list of drugs was no longer covered by statutory health 
insurance.  
• The 2008 Social Security Finance Act introduced the use of economics in 
health technology assessments.  














• 1981 Health Insurance Cost-containment Amendment Act 
• Health Insurance Contribution Rate Exoneration Act of 1996. 
Represented a shift from cost-containment to an expansion of private 
payments. Co-payments were viewed as way to put new money into the 
system. Further strengthened with First and Second Statutory Health 
Insurance Restructuring Acts of 1997. 
• Three months after the government was re-elected in September 2002, it 
introduced two reform bills with ad hoc austerity measures to reduce 
expenditure. The 12th SGB V Amendment Act froze ambulatory and 
hospital care budgets for 2003.  









AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.20. 
1994 1994 • Law 2071 of 1992: modernization and organization of the health system.  
The aim was to replace state responsibility with social security and the 
private sector in the delivery and financing of health services. Incentives 
to contract with private insurance were given. Co-payment rates for drugs, 
per diem hospital reimbursement and insurance contributions were 
increased. Furthermore, fees were introduced for visits to outpatient 
hospital departments as well as for inpatient admissions. Tax deductions 
for private insurance premiums were also adopted. (Economou 2010)  
1992 1992 
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Country  Time 
period 
Specification of 
filter based on 
sample properties 
Detected privatisation Policy change: Privatisations 
BIC B&P, global 
L breaks vs. 
none 






AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15. 
1993 1993 • The 1990 Health Care Act. Introduction of out-of-pocket user fees. From 
1991 this led to increasing out-of-pocket payments for users of the 






No time trend 
Trimming 0.15. 
1985 1985, 2006 • In 2005 the interim Health Information and Quality Authority was 
established to increase cost effectiveness. Several additional initiatives 




AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15 
1994 1994 • 1992–1993 The government approved the first reform of the national 
health system (Legislative Decrees 502/1992 and 517/1993). This 
involved the start of a process of decentralizing health care powers to the 
regions and a parallel delegation of managerial autonomy to hospitals and 
local health units. The latter was envisaged within a broader model of 
internal market reform. During 1992–1993, co-payments were raised. 
















   
Netherlands 1972-
2002 
AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.20. 
1996  • 1994 Van Otterloo Act: low-income pensioners became eligible for 
sickness funds, however other medium income pensioners lost this right. 
They now had to rely on private insurance.  
• 1997. The threshold limit for access to sickness funds for pensioners was 
significantly raised. At the same time students could no longer be insured 
jointly under parent insurance. A system of limited user charges for 
sickness fund enrolees was introduced to give them an incentive to use 
health services more prudently. 






AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15 
1990 1990 • A Public Finance Act 1989 that made sweeping changes to financial 
management in the public sector. Chief executives were made responsible 
for financial management; comprehensive new reporting requirements 
including statements of service performance; and more emphasis on 
performance indicators were introduced (French et al. 2001). 
1989 1989 
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Country  Time 
period 
Specification of 
filter based on 
sample properties 
Detected privatisation Policy change: Privatisations 
BIC B&P, global 
L breaks vs. 
none 






AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15 
1980, 1989 1980, 1988, 
1997 
• As a result of the Municipalities’ Health Care Act of 1982 (1984), 
responsibility for the primary health care in Norway was transferred to the 
municipalities in 1984. The government wanted with this act to 
coordinate the health and social services at the local level, strengthen 
these services in relation to institutional care, improve resource 
utilization, strengthen preventive care, and lay the foundation for better 
allocation of health care personnel. In 1987, the act was extended to 
include environmentally oriented health activities. In 1988 the 
Municipalities Health Care Act was further expanded when the 
responsibility of the counties’ nursing homes was transferred to the 
municipalities.  
• 1997 activity based financing gave economic incentives to increase 






AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15 
1982 1982, 2006 • Since 1982 voluntary private health care insurance could be taken out at 
an individual basis. Before this was only possible at the group level.  
• Several initiatives from 2003-2006 to reduce public spending: 
update/increase co-payments, implement purchaser-provider split, pay by 
results. 







AR(1) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15 
1989, 1995 1995 • In 1986 the General Health Care Act was approved. The process of 
devolving central public health powers to the regions was completed. 
• In 1987 health care powers were devolved to the Autonomous 
Communities of the Basque Country and Valencia. 
• In 1993 a selective list of pharmaceuticals was excluded from public 
funding for the first time. Free choice of GPs and paediatricians was 
generally introduced (piloted since 1984). 
•  In 1994 an agreement was reached amongst the central government and 
the special Autonomous Communities on the regional resource allocation 
system, which involved the rationalisation of a set of previous piecemeal, 
bilateral agreements, and the commitment to renegotiate the terms of the 
















• The 1982 Health and Medical Services Act. Cost containment was an 
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• The 1985 Dagmar reform continued the decentralization objective of the 
1982 reform. The main motive of the reform was to establish county 
council control over new private establishments through agreements and 
control over reimbursements to private providers. 
• The ÄDEL reform of 1992 was the biggest structural reform of health 
care provision and financing in the 1990’s. It contained several initiatives 
to contain public health care costs.  
• 1998 Patients’ share of the drug costs was increased, as a result of a 
reformed National Drug Benefit Scheme. In 1999 dental reform that 
meant an increase in patients’ co-payments.  













• The health system has only been reformed in 1994 in the data period. The 
health insurance law made the purchasing of health insurance compulsory 








AR(2) fixed lag 
specification.  
Trimming 0.15 
1985, 1997 1985, 1997 • During the 1980 the Conservative Government introduced a series of 
initiatives aimed at improving NHS efficiency.   
• In 1985, a Selected List Scheme was introduced restricting the range of 
medicines that are available through NHS prescriptions. 
• In 1997 a new government came into place. It started a whole reform 
program, massive in scope,that changed the NHS fundamentally.  It 
relied on six principles such as increased de-centralisation and decreased 





















   
Data source for detected privatisations: OECD.org, Economic Outlook nr. 90. West German data is used prior 1990 for Germany.  
Data source for validated privatisations: WHO/ European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies country HSiT (Healthcare Systems in 




Table A3: Descriptive statistics of matching covariates 
Variables  Obs. Mean St.d. Min. Max. Source 
GDP growth rate 565 2.718 2.153 -6.371 10.917 OECD.org 
Unemployment rate 565 6.490 3.428 0.426 19.108 OECD.org 
Interest rate in long-term government debt 565 8.883 5.747 1.003 48.8 OECD.org 
Inflation rate 565 5.671 7.712 -0.892 83.95 OECD.org 
Government ideology 565 2.853 0.925 1 4 Potrafke (2009) 
Government fragmentation 565 0.250 0.259 0 0.806 Beck et al. (2001) 
Population share over 65 years 565 13.880 2.571 8.4 20.8 OECD.org 





Fig. A1: Common support distribution of the propensity scores for BIC filter specification 
Fig. A1 shows the estimated propensity scores for the treated observations and the control observations for the privatisations identified using the BIC filter specification. Concerning 
treatment observations with a propensity score above 0.5 there is no overlap in the propensity score distributions, i.e. there are no suitable counterfactual(s). For the remaining 
treatment observations there are suitable counterfactuals, which have a similar propensity of receiving a treatment based on observable characteristics. The privatisations in Denmark 





Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., 2006. Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run 
growth. In: Aghion, P., Durlauf, S. (Eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth. Elsevier, 
Amsterdam, Netherlands, pp. 385-472. 
Aidt, T., Franck, R. 2015. Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution:Evidence from the Great 
Reform Act of 1832.Econometrica 83(2), 505-547. 
Alesina, A., Drazen, A., 1991. Why are stabilizations delayed? American Economic Review 81, 
1170–1188. 
Amiri, A., Ventelou, B., 2012. Granger causality between total expenditure on health and GDP in 
OECD: Evidence from the Toda–Yamamoto approach. Economics Letters 116, 541–544. 
Antoshin, S., Berg, A., Souto, M., 2008. Testing for structural breaks in small samples. Working 
paper no. 08/75, IMF. Washington D.C., U.S. 
Bai, J., Perron, P., 1998. Estimating and testing linear models with multiple structural changes. 
Econometrica 66, 47-78. 
Bai, J., Perron, P., 2003. Computation and analysis of multiple structural change models. Journal of 
Applied Econometrics 18, 1-22. 
Barroes, P. P., Simoes J. d.A., 2007. Health care systems in transition: Portugal. WHO Regional Office 
for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health, Systems and Policies 9, 1–227. 
Beck, N., Katz, J.N., Tucker, R., 1998. Taking time seriously: Time-series-cross-section analysis 
with a binary dependent variable. American Journal of Political Science 42, 1260–1288. 
Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P., 2001. New tools in comparative political 
economy: The Database of Political Institutions. The World Bank Economic Review 15, 
165-176. 
Boyle, Seán. 2011. United Kingdom (England): Health System Review. Health Systems in Transition 
13, 1–486 
Busse, R., Riesberg, A., 2004. Health care systems in transition: Germany. WHO Regional Office for 
Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health, Systems and Policies 6, 1–140. 
Cavaliere, A., Scabrosetti, S., 2007. Privatization and efficiency: From principals and agents to 
political economy. Journal of economic surveys, 1-26 
Chevreul, K., Durand-Zaleski, I., Bahrami, S., Hernández-Quevedo, C., Mladovsky, P., 2010. 
France: Health system review. Health Systems in Transition 12, 1–291. 
Colombo, F., Tapay, C., 2004. Private Health Insurance in OECD Countries: The Benefits and Costs 
for Individuals and Health Systems. OECD Health Working Papers No. 15.  
Di Matteo, L., Di Matteo, R., 1998. Evidence on the determinants of Canadian provincial 
government health expenditures: 1965 – 1991. Journal of Health Economics 17, 211–228. 
Drazen, A., 2000. Political Economy in Macroeconomics. Princeton University Press, N.J., USA. 
Drazen, A., Easterly, W., 2001. Do crises induce reform? Simple empirical test for conventional 
wisdom. Economics & Politics 13, 129–157. 
Economou, C., 2010. Greece: Health system review. Health Systems in Transition 12, 1–180. 
Exter, A., Hermans, H., Dosljak, M., Busse, R., 2004. Health care systems in transition: Netherlands. 
WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the European, Observatory on Health Systems 
and Policies 6, 1–147. 
French, S., Old, A., Healy, J., 2001. Health care systems in transition: New Zealand. WHO Regional 
Office for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 3, 
1–136. 
Glenngård, A.H., Hjalte, F., Svensson, M., Anell, A., Bankauskaite, V., 2005. Health systems in 
transition: Sweden. WHO Regional Office for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory 
on Health Systems and Policies, 7, pp. 1–145. 
Halldorsson, M., 2003. Health care systems in transition: Iceland. WHO Regional Office for Europe 
on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 5, 1–103. 
Hansen, P., King, A., 1996. The determinants of health care expenditure: A cointegration approach. 
Journal of Health Economics 15, 127-137. 
Healy, J., Sharman, E., Lokuge, B., 2006. Health systems in transition: Australia. WHO Regional 
Office for Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 8, 
 25
pp. 1–155. 
Heckman, J., Ichimura, H., Todd P., 1997. Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator: 
Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Program, Review of Economic Studies 64, 605-
654. 
Hellman, J.S., 1998. Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist 
Transitions. World Politics 50(2), 203-234. 
Hibbs, D.A., 1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. The American Political Science 
Review 71, 1467-1487. 
Hitiris, T., Posnett, J., 1992. The determinants and effects of health expenditure in developed 
countries. Journal of Health Economics 11, 173-181. 
Hofmarcher, M.M., Rack, H.-M., 2006. Austria: Health system review. Health Systems in Transition 
8, 1–247. 
HSiT (Healthcare Systems in Transition), T. World Health Organization and European Observatory 
on Health Syscbtems and Policies. (year of publication and country is given in the appendix) 
see: http://www.euro.who.int/en/who-we-are/partners/observatory/health-systems-in-
transition-hitseries. 
HSiT Portugal 1999. Portugal: Health care systems in transition. WHO Regional Office for Europe 
on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, pp. 1–92. 
HSiT Spain 2000. Spain: Health care systems in transition. WHO Regional Office for Europe on 
behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, pp. 1–144. 
HSiT Switzerland 2000. Switzerland: Health care systems in transition. WHO Regional Office for 
Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systemsand Policies, pp. 1–90. 
Huarng, K-H., Yu, T.H-K., 2015. Healthcare expenditure with causal recipes. Journal of Business 
Research, 68, 1570–1573. 
Imai, K. S., Arun, T., Annim, S. K., 2010 Microfinance and Household Poverty Reduction: New 
Evidence from India, World Development 38(12),  1760–1774. 
Johnsen, J.R., 2006. Health systems in transition: Norway. WHO Regional Office for Europe on 
behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 8, 1–187. 
Leu, R. E., 1986. The public–private mix and international health care costs, in: A.J. Culyer, B. 
Jonsson Eds.., Public and Private Health Services, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Liu, J., Wu, S., & Zidek, J.V., 1997. On segmented multivariate regressions. Statistica Sinica 7, 497-
525. 
Lo Scalzo, A., Donatini, A., Orzella, L., Cicchetti, A., Profili, S., Maresso, A., 2009. Italy: Health 
system review. Health Systems in Transition 11, 1–216. 
Marchildon, G.P., 2005. Health Systems in Transition, Canada. WHO Regional Office for Europe on 
behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies 7, 1–156. 
McDaid, D., Wiley, M., Maresso, A., Mossialos, E., 2009. Ireland: Health system review. Health 
Systems in Transition 11, 1–268. 
Mierau, J.O., Jong-A-Pin, R., & de Haan, J., 2007. Do political variables affect fiscal policy 
adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence. Public Choice 133, 297–319. 
OECD 1987. Financing and delivering health care: A comparative analysis of OECD countries. 
OECD Social Policy Studies No. 4. 
OECD 1992. The reform of health care: A comparative analysis of seven OECD countries. Health 
Policy Studies No. 2. 
Olejaz, M., Juul Nielsen, A., Rudkjøbing, A., Okkels, B.H., Krasnik, A., Hernández-Quevedo, C., 
2012. Denmark: Health systems review. Health Systems in Transition 14, 1–192. 
Oxley, H., MacFarlan, M., 1995. Healthcare reform: Controlling spending and increasing efficiency. 
OECD Economic Studies No. 24. 
Persson, T., Tabellini, G., Trebbi F., 2001. Electoral rules and corruption. NBER Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper 8154. 
Pitlik, H., Wirth, S., 2003. Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization?: an empirical 
test. European journal of Political Economy 19, 565-581. 
Potrafke, N., 2009. Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social 
expenditures in a panel of OECD countries. Public Choice 140, 105–124. 
Roberts, B.M., Saeed, M.A., 2012. Privatizations around the world: Economic or political 
 26
determinants? Economics & Politics 24, 47-71. 
Rodrik, D., 1996. Understanding economic policy reform. Journal of Economic Literature 34, 9–41. 
Rosenbaum, P., Rubin, D., 1983. The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies 
for Causal Effects. Biometrika 70, 41-55. 
Rubin, D., 1974. Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized 
Studies. Journal of Educational Psychology 66, 688-701. 
Rubin, D., 1977. Assignment to a Treatment Group on the Basis of a Covariate. Journal of 
Educational Statistics 2, 1-26. 
Saltman, R.B., Figueras, J., 1998. Analyzing the evidence on European health care reforms. Health 
Affairs 17(2), 85-108. 
Stabile, M., Thomson, S., 2014. The changing role of government in financing health care: An 
international perspective. Journal of Economic Literature 52(2), 480–518.  
Tuohy, C.H., Flood C.M., Stabile M., 2004. How Does Private Finance Affect Public Health Care 
Systems? Marshaling the Evidence from OECD Nations. Journal of Health Politics, Policy 
and Law 29(3), 359-396. 
Vickers, J., Yarrow, G., 1991. Economic perspectives on privatization. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 5, 111-132. 
Vuorenkoski, L., Mladovsky, P., Mossialos, E., 2008. Finland: Health system review. Health 
Systems in Transition 10, 1–168. 
Wiese, R., 2014. What triggers reforms in OECD countries? Improved reform measurement and 


















List of research reports 
 
 
12001-HRM&OB: Veltrop, D.B., C.L.M. Hermes, T.J.B.M. Postma and J. de Haan, A Tale 
of Two Factions: Exploring the Relationship between Factional Faultlines and Conflict 
Management in Pension Fund Boards 
 
12002-EEF: Angelini, V. and J.O. Mierau, Social and Economic Aspects of Childhood 
Health: Evidence from Western-Europe 
 
12003-Other: Valkenhoef, G.H.M. van, T. Tervonen, E.O. de Brock and H. Hillege, Clinical 
trials information in drug development and regulation: existing systems and standards 
 
12004-EEF: Toolsema, L.A. and M.A. Allers, Welfare financing: Grant allocation and 
efficiency 
 
12005-EEF: Boonman, T.M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and G.H. Kuper, The Global Financial Crisis 
and currency crises in Latin America 
 
12006-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and E. Sterken, Participation and Performance at the London 
2012 Olympics 
 
12007-Other: Zhao, J., G.H.M. van Valkenhoef, E.O. de Brock and H. Hillege, ADDIS: an 
automated way to do network meta-analysis 
 
12008-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Individualism and the cultural roots of management 
practices 
 
12009-EEF: Dungey, M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs, J. Tian and S. van Norden, On trend-cycle 
decomposition and data revision 
 
12010-EEF: Jong-A-Pin, R., J-E. Sturm and J. de Haan, Using real-time data to test for 
political budget cycles 
 
12011-EEF: Samarina, A., Monetary targeting and financial system characteristics: An 
empirical analysis 
 
12012-EEF: Alessie, R., V. Angelini and P. van Santen, Pension wealth and household 
savings in Europe: Evidence from SHARELIFE 
 
13001-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and M. Mulder, Cross-border infrastructure constraints, 
regulatory measures and economic integration of the Dutch – German gas market 
 
13002-EEF: Klein Goldewijk, G.M. and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, The relation between stature and 
long bone length in the Roman Empire 
 
13003-EEF: Mulder, M. and L. Schoonbeek, Decomposing changes in competition in the 
Dutch electricity market through the Residual Supply Index 
 
13004-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and M. Mulder, Cross-border constraints, institutional changes 











13005-EEF: Wiese, R., Do political or economic factors drive healthcare financing 
privatisations? Empirical evidence from OECD countries 
 
13006-EEF: Elhorst, J.P., P. Heijnen, A. Samarina and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, State transfers at 
different moments in time: A spatial probit approach 
 
13007-EEF: Mierau, J.O., The activity and lethality of militant groups: Ideology, capacity, 
and environment 
 
13008-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan and M. Mulder, The effect of industry structure and 
yardstick design on strategic behavior with yardstick competition: an experimental study 
 
13009-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Values of financial services professionals and the global 
financial crisis as a crisis of ethics 
 
13010-EEF: Boonman, T.M., Sovereign defaults, business cycles and economic growth in 
Latin America, 1870-2012 
 
13011-EEF: He, X., J.P.A.M Jacobs, G.H. Kuper and J.E. Ligthart, On the impact of the 
global financial crisis on the euro area 
 
13012-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Generational shifts in managerial values and the coming 
of a global business culture 
 
13013-EEF: Samarina, A. and J.E. Sturm, Factors leading to inflation targeting – The 
impact of adoption 
 
13014-EEF: Allers, M.A. and E. Merkus, Soft budget constraint but no moral hazard? The 
Dutch local government bailout puzzle 
 
13015-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Trust and management: Explaining cross-national 
differences in work autonomy 
 
13016-EEF: Boonman, T.M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and G.H. Kuper, Sovereign debt crises in 
Latin America: A market pressure approach 
 
13017-GEM: Oosterhaven, J., M.C. Bouwmeester and M. Nozaki, The impact of 
production and infrastructure shocks: A non-linear input-output programming approach, 
tested on an hypothetical economy 
 
13018-EEF: Cavapozzi, D., W. Han and R. Miniaci, Alternative weighting structures for 
multidimensional poverty assessment 
 
14001-OPERA: Germs, R. and N.D. van Foreest, Optimal control of production-inventory 
systems with constant and compound poisson demand 
 
14002-EEF: Bao, T. and J. Duffy, Adaptive vs. eductive learning: Theory and evidence 
 
14003-OPERA: Syntetos, A.A. and R.H. Teunter, On the calculation of safety stocks 
 
14004-EEF: Bouwmeester, M.C., J. Oosterhaven and J.M. Rueda-Cantuche, Measuring 
the EU value added embodied in EU foreign exports by consolidating 27 national supply 











14005-OPERA: Prak, D.R.J., R.H. Teunter and J. Riezebos, Periodic review and 
continuous ordering 
 
14006-EEF: Reijnders, L.S.M., The college gender gap reversal: Insights from a life-cycle 
perspective 
 
14007-EEF: Reijnders, L.S.M., Child care subsidies with endogenous education and 
fertility 
 
14008-EEF: Otter, P.W., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and A.H.J. den Reijer, A criterion for the number 
of factors in a data-rich environment 
 
14009-EEF: Mierau, J.O. and E. Suari Andreu, Fiscal rules and government size in the 
European Union 
 
14010-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan and M. Mulder, Industry structure and collusion 
with uniform yardstick competition: theory and experiments 
 
14011-EEF: Huizingh, E. and M. Mulder, Effectiveness of regulatory interventions on firm 
behavior: a randomized field experiment with e-commerce firms 
 
14012-GEM: Bressand, A., Proving the old spell wrong: New African hydrocarbon 
producers and the ‘resource curse’ 
 
14013-EEF: Dijkstra P.T., Price leadership and unequal market sharing: Collusion in 
experimental markets 
 
14014-EEF: Angelini, V., M. Bertoni, and L. Corazzini, Unpacking the determinants of life 
satisfaction: A survey experiment 
 
14015-EEF: Heijdra, B.J., J.O. Mierau, and T. Trimborn, Stimulating annuity markets 
 
14016-GEM: Bezemer, D., M. Grydaki, and L. Zhang, Is financial development bad for 
growth? 
 
14017-EEF: De Cao, E. and C. Lutz, Sensitive survey questions: measuring attitudes 
regarding female circumcision through a list experiment 
 
14018-EEF: De Cao, E., The height production function from birth to maturity 
 
14019-EEF: Allers, M.A. and J.B. Geertsema, The effects of local government 
amalgamation on public spending and service levels. Evidence from 15 years of municipal 
boundary reform 
 
14020-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and J.H. Veurink, Central bank independence and political 
pressure in the Greenspan era 
 
14021-GEM: Samarina, A. and D. Bezemer, Do Capital Flows Change Domestic Credit 
Allocation? 
 
14022-EEF: Soetevent, A.R. and L. Zhou, Loss Modification Incentives for Insurers Under 










14023-EEF: Allers, M.A. and W. Vermeulen, Fiscal Equalization, Capitalization and the 
Flypaper Effect. 
 
14024-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Trust, Workplace Organization, and Comparative 
Economic Development. 
 
14025-GEM: Bezemer, D., and L. Zhang, From Boom to Bust in de Credit Cycle: The Role 
of Mortgage Credit. 
 
14026-GEM: Zhang, L., and D. Bezemer, How the Credit Cycle Affects Growth: The Role 
of Bank Balance Sheets. 
 
14027-EEF: Bružikas, T., and A.R. Soetevent, Detailed Data and Changes in Market 
Structure: The Move to Unmanned Gasoline Service Stations. 
 
14028-EEF: Bouwmeester, M.C., and B. Scholtens, Cross-border Spillovers from 
European Gas Infrastructure Investments. 
 
14029-EEF: Lestano, and G.H. Kuper, Correlation Dynamics in East Asian Financial 
Markets. 
 
14030-GEM: Bezemer, D.J., and M. Grydaki, Nonfinancial Sectors Debt and the U.S. 
Great Moderation. 
 
14031-EEF: Hermes, N., and R. Lensink, Financial Liberalization and Capital Flight: 
Evidence from the African Continent. 
 
14032-OPERA: Blok, C. de, A. Seepma, I. Roukema, D.P. van Donk, B. Keulen, and R. 
Otte, Digitalisering in Strafrechtketens: Ervaringen in Denemarken, Engeland, Oostenrijk 
en Estland vanuit een Supply Chain Perspectief. 
 
14033-OPERA: Olde Keizer, M.C.A., and R.H. Teunter, Opportunistic condition-based 
maintenance and aperiodic inspections for a two-unit series system. 
 
14034-EEF: Kuper, G.H., G. Sierksma, and F.C.R. Spieksma, Using Tennis Rankings to 
Predict Performance in Upcoming Tournaments 
 
15001-EEF: Bao, T., X. Tian, X. Yu, Dictator Game with Indivisibility of Money 
 
15002-GEM: Chen, Q., E. Dietzenbacher, and B. Los, The Effects of Ageing and 
Urbanization on China’s Future Population and Labor Force 
 
15003-EEF: Allers, M., B. van Ommeren, and B. Geertsema, Does intermunicipal 
cooperation create inefficiency? A comparison of interest rates paid by intermunicipal 
organizations, amalgamated municipalities and not recently amalgamated municipalities 
 
15004-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan, and M. Mulder, Design of Yardstick Competition 
and Consumer Prices: Experimental Evidence 
 












15006-EEF: Anufriev, M., T. Bao, A. Sutin, and J. Tuinstra, Fee Structure, Return Chasing 
and Mutual Fund Choice: An Experiment 
 
15007-EEF: Lamers, M., Depositor Discipline and Bank Failures in Local Markets During 
the Financial Crisis 
 
15008-EEF: Oosterhaven, J., On de Doubtful Usability of the Inoperability IO Model 
 
15009-GEM: Zhang, L. and D. Bezemer, A Global House of Debt Effect? Mortgages and 
Post-Crisis Recessions in Fifty Economies 
 
15010-I&O: Hooghiemstra, R., N. Hermes, L. Oxelheim, and T. Randøy, The Impact of 
Board Internationalization on Earnings Management 
 
15011-EEF: Haan, M.A., and W.H. Siekman, Winning Back the Unfaithful while Exploiting 
the Loyal: Retention Offers and Heterogeneous Switching Costs 
 
15012-EEF: Haan, M.A., J.L. Moraga-González, and V. Petrikaite, Price and Match-Value 
Advertising with Directed Consumer Search 
 
15013-EEF: Wiese, R., and S. Eriksen, Do Healthcare Financing Privatisations Curb Total 
Healthcare Expenditures? Evidence from OECD Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
